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Manifestly then, Jones & Laughlin does not control the seventh 
amendment claim arising under the OSHA procedure in question. If 
that case is given a narrow reading, Judge Gibbons' distinction is 
conclusive. Even the expansive test implicit in Justice Marshall's 
characterization of Jones @ Laughlin would not mandate a denial of 
a seventh amendment claim. And, certainly, Jones & Laughlin cannot 
support a holding that all administrative proceedings, including the 
OSHA enforcement procedure, are outside the scope of the seventh 
amendment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Subject to the foregoing clarifications and expansions, Judge 
Gibbons' position clearly represents the current state of the law and 
the best thinking. Accordingly, on rehearing, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals will be forced to deal with Judge Gibbons' conclusion 
with a more sophisticated analysis than was employed by the 
majority in the instant opinion. Hopefully, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals will shun the questionable judicial technique employed by 
the majority in Irey when that panel anticipated the Supreme Court, 
relying on no more than the "thrust" of certain precedents,G4 and 
refused to vindicate a fundamental right. Paraphrasing Judge 
Gibbons, in the absence of a case in point in the Supreme Court, it is 
preferable to assume that the seventh amendment still has 
meaning.65 
Criminal P ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - D I S C O V E R Y - P R E T R I A L  DISCOVERY DEPOSITION IN
UTAH CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS-S tate v. Nielsen, 52 2 P. 2d 1 3 66 (Utah 
1974). 
The defendant, a Logan, Utah, city commissioner, was charged 
with misuse of public funds, a felony, and with a misdemeanor count 
of using his position to secure privileges or exemptions. Four days 
later he served seven Logan citizens with notice that their depositions 
would be taken pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
prospective witnesses were also served with subpoenas duces tecum 
calling for the production of certain documents relating to the 
criminal charges. In response, the state quickly brought an action for 
a declaratory judgment to determine the defendant's right to take 
the depositions. The district court issued an order permanently stay- 
643 CCH EMPLOYMENT SAFETY & HEALTH GUIDE (1974-1975 OSHD) 7 18,927, at 22,729 
n.11. 
65Zd. at 22.735. 
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ing the taking of depositions and also staying the criminal actions 
pending appeal. From that order the defendant appealed to the Utah 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower court's decision and held 
that the defendant could not depose prosecution witnesses for dis- 
covery purposes. 
I. DEPOSITIONS DE BENE ESSE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
DEPOSITIONS FOR DISCOVERY 
At common law there was no disc0very.l By the 18th century, 
however, courts of equity had developed the suit to take testimony 
de bene esse or ~onditionally.~ If the petitioner established (1) that 
the testimony of the witness sought to be deposed was material to a 
pending action at law; (2) that the witness was sick, old, or about to 
leave the country so as to present danger that his testimony would be 
lost; and (3) that there was no remedy at law, the chancellor would 
issue a decree authorizing a deposition de bene e ~ s e . ~  If the deposed 
witness thereafter became unavailable, the depositions taken pur- 
suant to the chancellor's decree were admissible at trial in courts of 
lawP The goal of equity and the basis of its jurisdiction was the 
prevention of the injustice that would result if a key witness were 
unable to  attend triaL5 Discovery of the deponent's testimony was 
undoubtedly an incidental benefit of depositions de bene esse, but 
the device was viewed solely as a tool for preserving testimony and 
not as a means of discoveryO6 
The necessity of a collateral proceeding in equity to preserve testi- 
mony for an action at law proved cumbersome, and American juris- 
dictions, by statute, made the remedy of conditional examinations 
available at law? The statutory schemes, which effectively super- 
lAt early common law there was no pretrial discovery in civil cases, R. MILLAR, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 201 (1952) [hereinafter 
cited as MILLAR] ; James, Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746 (1929); nor in criminal cases, 
Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAW. L. REV. 1, 2 (1956); Note, 
Criminal Discovery- The State of the h w ,  6 UTAH L. REV. 531 (1959). I n  equity a 
bill for discovery provided a limited and somewhat cumbersome opportunity for ac- 
cess to the opponent's case. MILLAR 201, 204; 6 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO- 
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW $ 1846 (3d ed. 1940) [herein- 
after cited as WIGMORE]. However, this bill found limited use in federal courts in the 
United States. Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure, 38 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 179,1184 (1938); see James, Discovery, 38 YALE L. J. 746-49 (1929). 
2De bene esse means "conditionally; provisionally; in anticipation of future needs." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 476 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). For a discussion of the history in 
equity of this bill see J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE $5 213-15 (4th 
ed. 1918) [hereinafter cited as POMEROY] . 
3Richter v. Jerome, 25 F. 679,680-81 (1885); 1 POMEROY $ 213. 
4Unavailability of the witness was the condition (as in conditional examination) upon 
which the use of the deposition at trial depended. See 1 POMEROY $ 215. 
51 POMEROY $ 210. 
'jThe bill was sought by the party to whose case the witness was material and favor- 
able. There would seem to be little incentive to preserve the testimony of opposing 
witnesses. See Richter v. Jerome, 25 F. 679,680-81 (1885). 
71 POMEROY $5 210,215. 
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seded examinations de bene esse,* generally followed the procedure 
in equity and required a showing of probable unavailability of a 
material witness as a prerequisite to taking a testimony for con- 
ditional use? For example, the Utah statute passed in 1898 and 
modeled after a California law,lo made conditional examinations 
available to criminal defendants if the deponent was material to the 
defense and if there existed reasonable grounds for concern that he 
would be unable to attend trial.ll That statute, now codified as 
chapter 7 7-46 of the Utah Code Annotated, authorized the taking of 
conditional depositions of defense witnesses in the manner provided 
in that chapter "and not otherwise."12 
The right to make conditional examinations was codified in Utah 
and other states long before the concept of liberal pretrial discovery 
gained wide acceptance.13 The primary impetus for the liberal 
discovery deposition rules currently available was provided by the 
promulgation and adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in 1938.14 Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which is 
substantially identical to the federal rule, exemplifies that liberality: 
merely by giving reasonable notice to other parties, one may take the 
testimony of any person by deposition upon oral examination.l5 No 
- -  
81 POMEROY 8 215. 
%ee, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, $ 30, 1 Stat. 88-90 (also allowed when witness 
lives more than 100 miles from the place of trial); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, $ 24 
(1959). 
 OUTA AH CODE ANN. $ 77-46 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1973). This chapter was sub- 
stantially identical to CAL. PENAL CODE $$ 1335-39, 41-44, 47 (West 1970), though the 
California statute has been modified since the enactment of the Utah law. An im- 
portant modification was the deletion of the words "and not otherwise" in 1905. Id. at 
8 1335. 
llThe Utah statute does not allow prosecutorial depositions to preserve testimony. 
Wigmore explains that many states did not allow such depositions in deference to the 
sixth amendment right to confront witnesses. He claims that admitting previously 
taken depositions, after complying with the hearsay rule, however, is not violative of 
the constitutional provision. 5 WIGMORE $ 1397. California has allowed introduction 
of prosecution depositions as far as constitutionally allowable. CAL. PENAL CODE $5 1335- 
41 (West 1970). 
12The statute, in relevant part, provides: 
When a defendant has been held to answer a charge for a public offense or mal- 
feasance in office he may, either before or after an indictment or information, have 
witnesses examined conditionally, on his behalf, as prescribed in this chapter, and 
not otherwise. 
When a material witness for the defendant is about to leave the state, or is so 
sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for apprehending that he will be un- 
able to attend the trial, the defendant may apply for an order that the witness be 
examined conditionally. 
UTAH CODE ANN. $8 77-46-1, -2 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added). 
13For a discussion of the status of discovery throughout the United States in the 
early part of the 20th century, see G. RAGLUND, ISCOVERY BEFORE TRIAL 32-36, 46-53, 
267-391 (1932) [hereinafter cited as RAGLUND] . 
14For a discussion of the changes in discovery procedure made by the adoption of the 
federal rules see MILLAR 201-28. Most states have adopted substantial portions of the 
federal rules. Clark, Two Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435 
(1 958). 
WTAH R. CIV. P. 30 (identical to FED. R. CIV. P. 30). 
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reason for taking the deposition need be given. Permission of the 
court is required only in special circumstances, and attendance of 
witnesses can be compelled by subpoena.16 Although rule 30 
depositions are admissible at trial if the witness becomes unavail- 
able,17 such depositions are most commonly used in practice for 
discovery purposes, not for the preservation of testimony.18 
Pretrial discovery in criminal proceedings has been much more 
limited than in civil actions, though increasingly both prosecutors 
and defendants are being afforded the benefits of discovery proce- 
dures. For example, defendants have been given significant pretrial 
access to evidence held by the prosecutor,lg and prosecutors in a 
few jurisdictions have been allowed advance notice of intended alibi 
defenses.20 Also, a handful of states have followed Vermont by 
adopting rules which authorize discovery depositions in criminal 
 proceeding^.^^ Nevertheless, discovery depositions are not allowed 
under the recently adopted federal rules of criminal procedure; these 
rules only authorize the statutory analogue of deposition de bene 
e ~ s e . ~ ~  
Utah has only indirectly confronted the question of criminal dis- 
covery depositions. In 19 72, the Utah Supreme Court promulgated 
rule 81(e) as part of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule 
provides that "[t] hese rules of [civil] procedure shall also govern in 
any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable 
statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional req~ irernen t . "~~  Whether rule 
8 1(e) authorized rule 30 depositions in criminal proceedings was an 
open question until 1974 when the Utah Supreme Court decided the 
case of State u. N z ' e l ~ e n . ~ ~  
17Rule 30 depositions are admissible at trial under UTAH R. CIV. P. 32(a) if the wit- 
ness is unable to attend or resides more than 100 miles from the court. 
18For a survey of the use of depositions nationwide, see W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY 
AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 58-67 (1968). 
lgSee generally R. Fletcher, Pretrial Dbcovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. 
REV. 293, 297-304 (1960); Note, Criminal Discovery - The State of the Law, 6 UTAH L. 
REV. 531 (1959). 
20By 1971, 17 states had adopted statutes requiring defendants to give notice of an 
intended alibi defense. Comment, The Alibi Witness Rule: Sewing U p  the "Hip 
Pocket" Defense, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 155, 156 (1971). As to the constitutionality of 
such statutes, see Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S: 470 (1973); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 
78 (1970). 
21V~.  R. CRIM. P. 15(a). Florida, FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(d), Missouri, Mo. R. CRIM P. 
25.10, and New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 517.13 (1968), have followed Ver- 
mont in allowing depositions without court approval. Other states allow discovery de- 
positions with court approval. ALAS. R. CRIM. P. 15(a); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. 95- 
1802(a)(l) (1948); OHIO REV. CODE 5 2945.50 (1975); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 39.02 
(1966). A discussion of progress in allowing criminal discovery depositions is found in 
UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 431(a), Comment. 
2 2 F ~ ~ .  R. CRIM. P. 15. This rule, adopted in 1946, 327 U.S. 825, 844, in addition to 
allowing depositions when the witness may be unable to attend trial, allows deposi- 
tions of witnesses who have been committed for failure to give bail. 
2 3 U ~ ~ ~  R. CIV. P. 81(e). 
24522 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974). 
CASE NOTES 
The plaintiff in the instant case, the State of Utah, argued that 
rule 30 depositions were not available in criminal proceedings be- 
cause such depositions, in the words of rule 81(e), "conflicted with" 
the statutory provisions of chapter 77-46. That statute authorizes 
depositions only when it is probable that the deponent will be 
unavailable at trial. Rule 30 has no such limiting requirement and is 
available for discovery purposes as well as for the preservation of 
testimony. To the extent, therefore, that rule 30 deviates from the 
exclusive deposition procedure of chapter 7 7-46, it is in conflict with 
the statute.25 
The defendant claimed that rule 81(e) authorized the taking of 
rule 30 depositions in criminal cases. He argued that allowance of 
discovery depositions would not conflict with any statutory or 
constitutional provisions. Chapter 77-46 was the only statute that 
discussed depositions by criminal defendants, and it encompassed 
within its scope only depositions to preserve testimony and not 
discovery  deposition^.^^ 
The court was thus faced with the question of whether rule 30 
discovery depositions were within the scope of chapter 77-46's 
regulation of conditional examinations. If discovery depositions were 
not included in that prohibition, then by the terms of rule 81(e) the 
defendant was entitled to take depositions pursuant to rule 30. The 
court held that the statutory provision that a witness may not be 
examined conditionally other than as provided in chapter 7 7-46 
includes within its meaning all types of depositions. Discovery 
depositions are therefore not available to criminal  defendant^.^^ 
The court also reasoned that rule 30 depositions would conflict 
with the self-incrimination privilege of the Utah cons t i tu t i~n?~ Rule 
30 provides that "any party may take the testimony of any person, 
including a party,"29 thus leaving the door open for attempts by 
prosecutors or codefendants to take depositions of witnesses, includ- 
ing defendants. The court stated that "[a] n attempt to take a 
deposition of a [criminal] defendant would violate his right against 
self-incrimination and his right to remain silent."30 In conclusion, 
therefore, the court held that rule 30 depositions are not available in 
criminal proceedings because, in the language of rule 81(e), such 
depositions conflict with the statutory provisions of chapter 77-46 
and the constitutional protections against compelled self-incrimina- 
tion. 
25Brief for Appellee at 2-5, State v. Nielsen, 522 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974). 
26Brief for Appellant at 4-6, State v. Nielsen, 522 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1974). 
27522 P.2d at 13-7. 
281d. at 1367. 
2 9 U ~ ~ ~  R. CIV. P. 30(a) (emphasis added). 
30522 P.2d at 1367 (emphasis added). 
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A. Misconstruction of Chapter 7 7-46 and of the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination 
There are indications that the Utah Supreme Court in Nielsen 
misconstrued chapter 7 7-46 and misapplied the self-incrimination 
privilege and thus incorrectly denied the defendant his opportunity 
to depose prosecution witnesses. The statute now codified as chapter 
77-46 was originally passed in 1898.31 It could not have been passed 
in contemplation of discovery depositions: such depositions were not 
available under Utah law at that time, they were not in use in any 
jurisdiction, and no statute was needed to proscribe their The 
limiting language of the statute, that a defendant may "have wit- 
nesses examined conditionally . . . as prescribed in this chapter and 
not ~ t h e r w i s e , " ~ ~  can only with difficulty be interpreted as a 
prohibition of a device not in existence when the statute was 
adopted. Arguably the sole intent of the legislature in drafting chap- 
ter 77-46 was to make available to  criminal defendants in courts of 
law the equitable remedy of the deposition de bene esse and to limit 
and control the application of the remedy.34 The "and not other- 
wise" language serves merely to limit conditional examinations to 
those circumstances where a material witness is likely to become 
unavailable at a later trial, a requirement long a part of examinations 
de bene esse but not a part of discovery deposition procedures that 
developed later. Chapter 77-46 is more correctly construed, there- 
fore, as a definition of the parameters of the opportunity to preserve 
testimony and not as a prohibition of a device-discovery deposi- 
tions-not in existence at the time of the adoption of the statute. 
The fact that the statute deals only with a defendant's examina- 
tion of his own witnesses is further evidence that discovery deposi- 
tions were not within the contemplation of chapter 77-46 and, 
therefore, not within the scope of its prohibition. Indeed, that fact 
clearly reveals that chapter 77-46 is an expression of the basic pur- 
pose of examinations de bene esse, preservation of a beneficial 
3 1 U ~ ~ ~  REV. STAT. ~ h .  48 (1898). 
32Although a few jurisdictions began to allow discovely depositions in the early 20th 
century in civil practice, ~ G L U N D ,  supra note 13; Mullen, Depositions in  Massachu- 
setts and New Hampshire, 2 BOSTON B.J. 21, 23-24 (1958), there is no evidence of use of 
such depositions in criminal proceedings. 
3 3 U ~ ~ ~  CODE ANN. $77-46-1 (Supp. 1973). 
S4The legislature could have (1) prohibited the taking of depositions except on a 
showing of probable unavailability or (2) allowed them to be taken only at the discre- 
tion of the judge. See 6 WIGMORE $ 856(d), at 440. In any event, the legislature limited 
the use of depositions unless the witness in fact were unavailable. UTAH CODE ANN. 
774611 (1953): 
The deposition, or a certified copy thereof, may be read in evidence by either 
party on the trial when it appears that the witness is unable to attend by reason of 
his death, insanity, illness or infirmity, or of his continued absence from the state. 
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testimony.35 One does not depose one's own witness for discovery 
purposes. By the same token, one does not depose adverse witnesses 
to ensure the preservation for trial of their testimony. By limiting the 
scope of chapter 77-46 to depositions of the defendant's own wit- 
nesses, the legislature left discovery depositions, such as those 
provided for by rule 30, unprohibited. 
The court's argument that rule 30 depositions could be taken in 
violation of the self-incrimination privilege is also infirm. Simply 
stated, the deposition provisions of the rules of civil procedure can- 
not be used to compel either a nondefendant witness or a defendant 
witness to give incriminating testimony. A nondefendant witness' 
privilege against self-incrimination, for example, is only a privilege to 
refuse to answer a particular question, and then only when the 
answer to the question might incriminate him.36 Even in criminal 
proceedings he may be compelled to  appear in court, to be sworn, 
and to answer nonincriminating questions.3' By analogy, it would 
not violate a nondefendant witness' constitutional right to subpoena 
him to give a deposition, to  require him to be sworn, and to  require 
his answers to nonincriminating questions.38 
Even an attempt to depose a defendant witness does not violate 
his right not to be compelled to  testify against himself. The privilege 
of an accused includes the right not to take the witness stand. 39 
Indeed, at trial the prosecution is probably precluded from even 
calling the accused as a witness on the theory that to  do so would 
unfairly emphasize to the jury the accused's failure to  testify. 40 
However, there would be no prejudicial effect in merely asking a 
defendant, outside of the jury's presence, to give a deposition. The 
only question is whether he will be compelled to testify against 
himself at a deposition under the rules of civil procedure. 
Taking those rules as a whole, they provide ample protection 
against compulsory depositions of a criminal defendant. A defendant 
has two basic alternatives to avoid testifying. He may seek a protec- 
tive order to stop the deposition proceedings pursuant to rule 
2 6 ( ~ ) , ~ l  or he may simply refuse to be sworn or to answer any 
questions or even to appear at the depositionP2 The first alternative 
requires affirmative action by the defendant in the form of a motion 
35The dichotomy between the two types of depositions is illustrated by the dilemma 
sometimes faced by a party who, by discovering an opposing witness' testimony, may 
be preserving testimony that would prove harmful if the witness died or otherwise 
became unavailable. RAGLUND 52. 




40See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 131 (E. CLEARY ed. 1972). 
4 1 U ~ ~ ~  R. CIV. P. 26(~) .  
42Refusal to be "discovered" is apparently prima facie grounds for an order compel- 
ling answers. UTAH R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2). However, there is no indication that such an 
order would be granted in violation of a defendant's rights. 
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to  the court for a protective order. Yet the rules authorize such an 
order "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, 
oppression or undue burden.'q3 Violation of an accused's constitu- 
tional right not to be compelled to testify against himself should 
qualify as embarrassment or oppression and hence as sufficient 
grounds for the issuance of a protective order. 
The defendant's second alternative-refusal to be sworn and to 
testify-does not require affirmative action by the defendant. Rather, 
the party seeking discovery must, by motion to the court, seek an 
order compelling the defendant to  take the stand as a deponent. As 
an abridgement of his right against self-incrimination, the motion 
would be denied. 
B. Pros and Cons of Discovery Depositions in Criminal Proceedings 
Though the court misconstrued both statutory and constitutional 
doctrines to reach its conclusion in Nielsen, perhaps it had sound 
policy reasons for concluding that discovery depositions should not 
be allowed in criminal cases. There is the possibility that allowing 
discovery by a defendant would invite contrived defenses and 
perjury.44 Also, easy access to witnesses might facilitate intimidation 
of witnesses.45 And if defendants already have a weighted advantage 
in the criminal adversary process,46 defense discovery should be 
limited so as to counterbalance restrictions imposed on the prosecu- 
tion by self-incrimination and due process doctrines. 
Yet the arguments against criminal discovery, though widely 
supported in judicial opinions, are not ultimately persuasive. For 
example, in an oft-cited opinion denying discovery, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court argued that "in criminal proceedings, long experience 
has taught the courts that often discovery will not lead to honest 
fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and suppression of 
evidence.'"' But the court offers no details of its own experience. In 
fact, New Jersey, along with most jurisdictions, has had little or no 
experience with criminal discovery because they have provided no 
procedure therefor.48 What experience there is suggests that the 
fears of perjury and intimidation of witnesses are unfounded.49 One 
observer of the results of Vermont's experiment with liberal criminal 
depositions claimed that those fears had not been realized after 5 
44See, e.g., Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 
1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279,289 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Brennan]. 
451d. 
461d.; Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L.  REV. 
56,57 (1961). 
47State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203,210,98 A.2d 881,884 (1953). 
48Brennan 290-91. 
491d. The fear of perjury was also a common argument against discovery in civil 
cases. Experience has not substantiated those fears. Speck, The Use of Discovery in  
United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1154 (1951). 
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years of liberal criminal deposition rules.50 
In regard to pretrial discovery, concern about an imbalance in 
favor of criminal defendants is likewise not well founded. 51 
Although the prosecution cannot force the defendant to reveal 
incriminating information, the prosecution does have access to policy 
investigations as well as to grand jury proceedings. Also, in Utah, the 
prosecution is allowed by statute to  take secret inquiry deposi- 
tions.S2 In contrast, the defendant often has limited investigative 
resources,53 and, absent liberal discovery rules, he cannot compel 
witnesses to give any information before 
Proponents of more liberal discovery argue that the goal of the 
criminal system is to protect society's interests, and those interests 
are best served if both parties have an adequate opportunity to 
prepare for The Utah Supreme Court recognized the strength 
of that argument in State v. G ~ e r t s , ~ ~  holding that it was error, 
though not prejudicial,S7 to deny a defendant the right to take rule 
30 depositions in a quasi-criminal removal proceeding. The court 
questioned "why the district attorney opposed the taking of 
 deposition^,"^^ and stated: 
[The prosecutor] may have misconceived his duty. Notwithstanding 
the fact that under our adversary system it is essential that he represent 
and safeguard the interests of the State, it is neither necessary nor 
desirable that a prosecutor conduct either a persecution or an inquisi- 
tion. His responsibility is t o  assist in an inquiry into the facts t o  ascer- 
tain the truth t o  the end that justice be done.59 
The dissent in Guerts, arguing that denial of the right to take pretrial 
depositions was prejudicial error, pointed out that the use at trial of 
discovery depositions which demonstrate prior inconsistent testi- 
mony and thus impeach a witness "may make the difference between 
guilt and innocence in the minds of the  eni ire men."^^ Pretrial 
discovery allows adverse parties to make clear to the jury the 
strengths and weaknesses of the evidence on each side, thus aiding 
the quest for the "truth" of the particular case. Discovery deposi- 
tions in criminal proceedings should be allowed to the extent that 
5OLangrock, Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732-34 (1967). 
5lGoldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Pro- 
cedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149,1152, 1180-92 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein]. 
5 2 U ~ ~ ~  CODE ANN.5 77-45-20 (Supp. 1973). 
53Goldstein 1 182-83. 
54Zd. 
55See, e.g., Brennan 291. 
5611 Utah 2d 345,359 P.2d 12 (1961). 
57The court held that it was not reversible error in that case because the defendant 
had access to the testimony of the witnesses before the grand jury and was given answers 
to interrogatories served upon the prosecution. Id. at 351,359 P.2d at 17. 
58Zd. at 350,359 P.2d at 16. 
59Zd. 
60Zd. at 353,359 P.2d at 18 (dissenting opinion). 
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protection against misuse or inequalities to parties can be reasonably 
assured. 
C. The Problem with Rule 81(e) 
The court in Nielsen perhaps recognized that it would be unwise 
to apply civil discovery rules61 in criminal proceedings without first 
considering problems unique to criminal procedure. There is the 
need, for example, to balance the opportunities for prosecutor and 
accused to prepare for trial. The rules of civil procedure provide a 
relatively neutral discovery system.62 But a system of criminal 
discovery ought to consider and, to the extent possible, balance some 
of the factors already present in the criminal system which, in 
different ways, handicap trial preparation by either the prosecution 
or the defense.63 The prosecutor is severely limited in what he can 
discover from the opposing party because of the self-incrimination 
privilege. The prosecutor does have, however, greater opportunities 
to discover information held by nonparty witnesses since he can 
often compel them to give testimony at depositions or before a grand 
The defendant, except in special circumstances such as 
preliminary hearings, cannot force witnesses to give information 
prior to The rules of civil procedure, as used in criminal 
proceedings, do not achieve an adequate or fair compromise of these 
competing considerations. The civil rules were not designed with the 
peculiar problems of criminal discovery in mind. Certainly rule 
81(e)'s application of the rules of civil procedure to criminal pro- 
ceedings does not demonstrate the well-thought-out approach to 
criminal discovery that ought to be incorporated into any criminal 
discovery scheme. 
IV. C~NCLUSION 
If rule 81(e) was intended as a poorman's set of criminal proce- 
dure rules, it has demonstrated its deficiencies. The court should 
repeal rule 81(e) and adopt comprehensive rules of criminal proce- 
dure. The Utah court has been authorized to promulgate rules that 
could clearly define the allowable parameters of discoveryF6 and 
certainly models are available from which the court could frame 
effective rules. The court could choose not to allow depositions 
other than as provided by the scheme of chapter 77-46. This is the 
61The question facing the court involved only rule 30 depositions, but the court at- 
tempted to prohibit all use of civil discovery devices. 522 P.2d 1366,1867 (1974). 
62W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 89 (1968). 
63See generally Goldstein, supra note 51. 
641d. at 1 187-92. 
651d. at 1 180-82. 
WTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-4 (1953) (rules of procedure adopted by the court will 
supersede any conflicting procedural laws). 
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approach of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.G7 Alterna- 
tively, the court could follow the Uniform Rules of Criminal Proce- 
dure and allow defendants to take depositions without court 
0rder.~8 The Uniform Rules contain some protection for both the 
prosecution and the defense, and the court could devise further 
protections if such appeared necessary. A third "middle ground" 
alternative adopted by some states is to allow discovery depositions 
only on court order.69 
Whatever alternative the court may select can only be superior to  
the present scheme of rule 8 l(e).  That scheme all too easily leads, as 
the Nielsen case demonstrates, to artificial construction or even 
misconstruction of statute and rule and to an ad hoc creation of rules 
of criminal procedure. 
Torts-ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-A NEW RATIONALE FOR REFUSING TO 
EXTEND LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY NATURAL CONDITIONS- 
Loney u. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378, 521 P.2d 340 (1974) .  
The attractive nuisance doctrine has not generally been applied to 
injuries arising from natural conditions on pr0perty.l For some time, 
however, commentators have urged that liability be applied regard- 
less of the origin of the ~ o n d i t i o n . ~  They have argued that all cases 
to date denying attractive nuisance liability for natural conditions 
have involved hazards which the child should have unde r~ tood ,~  and 
that in the great majority of instances the burden on the landowner 
of removing the hazard would be exce~sive.~ The claim is that should 
a case arise in which the child does not understand the condition and 
in which the burden on the landowner of protecting the child is 
relatively light, there is no valid reason why liability should not be 
 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. See note 22 s u p a .  
68See note 21 supra. 
69See note 21 s u p a .  
lSee, e.g., 2 F .  HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 5 27.5, at 1452 (1956); W. 
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 5 59, at 367 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER] ; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 339, comment p (1965); Prosser, Trespassing Chil- 
dren, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427, 446 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Trespassing Children] ; 
2 OKLA. L. REV. 537,537-38 (1949). 
2See, e.g., PROSSER 8 59, at 367; Trespassing Children 446; Note, Trespassing Children: 
A Study in Expanding Liability, 20 VAND. L. REV. 139, 150 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
Expanding Liability] ; 2 OKLA. L. REV. 537,538 (1949). 
~PROSSER 5 59, at 367; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 339, comment p (1965); 
Trespassing Children 446. 
4 R ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 339, Comment p (1965); Trespassing Children 
446. 
